This article attempts to understand the properties, potentials and limits of middle-power activism in a changing global order.
US hegemony, in particular, has injected a high dose of fluidity and uncertainty into the international system and opened up new windows of opportunity for regional powers to shape their respective regions in their own image (Buzan and Waiver 2003) . Indeed, the global diffusion of power and the accompanying rise of emerging economies such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and near-BRICS (Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey) is contributing to the emergence of a new world (dis)order with significant possibilities for cooperation and conflict. 1 It is now apparent that we are living in 'a world of regions' (Katzenstein 2005) , in which 'the emerging regional architecture of world politics' (Acharya 2007 ) demands a thorough analysis of the 'multiregional system of international relations' (Hurrell 2007, 128 ).
An overriding theme in this new multiregional system of international relations concerns the future of the liberal international order (Kagan 2008; Jacques 2009; Ikenberry 2010, 511; Mearsheimer 2010; Shambaugh 2013) . There is no doubt that the changing power capacity, policy preferences and role conceptions of emerging powers are becoming key properties that will inform the future of regional and global governance. However, the debate on emerging powers mainly concentrates on the potentials and limits of BRICS for the future of the international order. In contrast to the dominant trend in the literature that emphasises the leading BRICS nations, our focus in this study is on the second group of 'emerging powers', or the 'near-BRICS', such as Turkey, Mexico and Indonesia, which tend to receive less attention in the existing literature. A plausible reason for this lacuna is that the middle-power literature mostly deals with established middle powers such as Canada and Australia (Ravenhill 1998; Chapnick 1999 Chapnick , 2000 Beeson 2011; Carr 2014) . There are a number of similarities and differences between established and emerging middle powers. The material capacity constraints in terms of military power, size and demography are a common aspect of these two groups. The established and emerging powers, however, differ significantly in terms of their role-model and governance capabilities within the international system. Established middle powers are often considered as 'catalysts' for promoting a liberal international order, 'facilitators' for building prostatus-quo coalitions, and 'managers' for disseminating orthodox norms and practices in their respective regions (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Ravenhill 1998; Carr 2014) . The emerging middle powers, which still remain an underexploited mine in the literature, seem to have different qualifications in this respect.
First, the capacity of emerging middle powers to serve as successful role models and stability-providers is heavily constrained by the comparatively low quality of their own development and democratisation experiences. Indeed, as Jordaan (2003, 171-172) points out, unequal development appears to be a pervasive feature, and the practice of liberal democracy still remains a work in progress in such states. Second, their domestic political economy features, as well as a semi-peripheral position in the hierarchy of global capitalism, inevitably make emerging middle powers hesitant players in legitimising the existing liberal international order, when compared with established middle powers (Schweller 2011, 291) . Rather, as Alden and Vieira (2005, 1081) underline, their critique of the international system 'has been rooted in a deeper structural analysis'. States of this nature face the dilemma that they are both critical of the existing liberal order dominated by the established Western powers and, at the same time, have an incentive to be a part of an international order based on liberal norms. Given these underlying dichotomies, some intricate and intriguing questions emerge: Under what conditions can emerging middle powers play a proactive role in the current international order? What are the dynamics, properties and limits of emerging middle-power activism in regional and global governance? Our central thesis is that emerging middle powers can make important contributions by amplifying their weight in regional and global governance. Their ultimate policy impact, however, depends on a mutually interacting and complementary set of conditions composed of four material and ideational factors (see below).
Relying on the middle-power literature and extending it, the second part of the article outlines this set of conditions that enables emerging middle powers to play a proactive role beyond their borders. The third and empirical part operationalises the conceptual framework by turning a critical eye on Turkey as a striking but mainly underexplored case of an 'emerging middle power' with potential demonstration effects in its neighbouring regions and beyond. The final part offers some generalisations that inform the broader literature on emerging middle powers in regional and global governance.
Emerging middle powers in regional and global governance: a framework for analysis 'Middle power' is a contested and controversial concept in the literature (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Ravenhill 1998; Carr 2014) to the extent that some scholars, such as Chapnick (1999 Chapnick ( , 2000 , even call it a 'myth' rather than an analytical category. Middle powers, as Wang and French (2013) suggest, are players with constrained material capacity in comparison to major powers in world politics and, as a result, their ability to single-handedly influence key regional or global policy agendas or conflicts is heavily restricted. On the other hand, these actors also have the capacity to 'protect themselves from the undesirable impacts of other countries' actions' (Wang and French 2013, 985 ; also see Carr 2014, 71) . This structural constraint, therefore, does not mean that world politics is a game that is only played by great powers. Especially in a post-hegemonic world order, middle powers have more room to manoeuvre through a variety of instruments and policies. The newly emerging middle powers in particular are becoming more vociferous in world affairs, especially in the post-crisis global political economy setting (Sandal 2014) . 2 In fact, as Cooper and Mo (2011) underline, 'middle powers can punch above their weight'. Yet how can it be possible for emerging middle powers to exert influence beyond their borders? Under what conditions can these actors 'punch above their weight'?
Relying on the mainstream literature on established middle powers (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Ravenhill 1998) and synthesising it with the recent debates (Jordaan 2003; Wang and French 2013) , we will identify four critical conditions which allow emerging middle powers to play a productive role in a rapidly shifting global environment. These conditions are (1) the ability to serve as role models based on their soft-power resources-i.e. the quality of their developmental and democratic credentials; (2) the capacity to build effective coalitions with both established and emerging powers on the basis of a consistent set of normative principles; (3) governance capacity based on a recognition of the limits of middle-power influence and avoiding a mismatch of expectations and capabilities; and (4) the capacity to identify niche areas in regional and global governance where they can make a distinct and unique contribution. In order to play proactive roles in regional and global governance, emerging middle powers need to craft a comprehensive framework that recognises the complex interdependence and meticulous synthesis of these four building blocks. We should state at the outset, however, that these four conditions are interactive and mutually inclusive, rather than hierarchic in terms of operationalisation and implementation. The building blocks are also composed of relatively definitive/stable variables that are latent in all countries by virtue of being a middle power (such as material capabilities) and improvable limits (such as role-model capabilities, niche diplomacy and alliance-building capacity), depending on the context in which emerging middle powers operate. The importance of the four building blocks might also vary according to contextual factors, as is the case in the Turkish example where role-model capacity predominates and guides other factors. This suggests that the non-hierarchic and interactive nature of the building blocks of middle-power activism reflects not only pure foreign policy settings, but also the dynamic interaction of broadly structural and domestic political economy settings.
The building blocks of emerging middle-power activism
The first criterion for emerging middle powers is related to their capability to serve as a role model both on a regional and a global basis. This ability, in turn, is based on the quality of their economic development and democratisation performance. South Korea is a good example of an emerging power, with a population of only 50 million. Although not a large country by the standards of China and India, its developmental performance has attracted significant international attention, as the literature on developmental and post-developmental states clearly testifies. Following a long period of authoritarian rule, South Korea, unlike many other emerging powers, has managed to successfully consolidate liberal democracy over the past three decades. Indeed, South Korea has reached a per capita income of US$25,000, which places it safely in the realm of established, rather than emerging, middle powers (Shin 2015) . South Korea has a good empirical record for being a role model as there is evidence available about other countries seeking out its experience in economic growth to learn from. It also demonstrates the ability of emerging middle powers to make a transition from emerging to established middle-power status based on their role-model and governance capacities.
The transition in status, however, takes time, as the institutional structures need to be developed consistently and steadily. The cases of Mexico and Indonesia are also striking, since the two countries have not only achieved noteworthy economic development in recent decades, but have also managed to accomplish substantial transformations of their political regimes, from highly entrenched authoritarian systems to more open and relatively democratic polities. Needless to say, both Mexico and Indonesia lag significantly behind South Korea in terms of both economic development and democratic credentials. The political regimes of Mexico and Indonesia are still in the hybrid-regime category, suggesting that they have some distance to travel in terms of consolidating liberal democracy.
In comparative terms, the classic examples of established middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, are far more advanced in terms of their levels of economic development and their long-lasting commitment to liberal democratic norms (Jordaan 2003) . It is quite striking, however, that the emerging middle-power category includes a significant group of countries which are consolidated democracies or hybrid regimes with a significant potential for further democratisation. For instance, the Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, Australia (MIKTA) group or the second-generation BRICS are broadly more democratic and hence more homogenous than the first-generation BRICS, which includes both highly authoritarian (China and Russia) and democratic states (India, Brazil and South Africa). What is important for our purposes is that emerging middle powers, through their role conceptions, can contribute to the economic and democratic development of states especially within, but also beyond, their immediate neighbourhood to raise their own regional and international standing. As Patience aptly accentuates, where their role conceptions do achieve positive currency within and outside [their] borders, other nation states may try to emulate [them], thereby not only establishing or enhancing [their] international legitimacy, but also transforming the circumstances of [their] region-or even aspects of the global order (Patience 2014, 212) .
To this end, coherent and internationally recognised role models, especially in the realm of democratisation and economic development, can upgrade the status of emerging middle powers.
The second building block of middle-power activism is related to effective alliance formation or coalition-building. The ability of such states to form inclusive and encompassing coalitions based on a consistent set of normative principles becomes a crucial variable that informs their foreign policy success (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993, 19; Ravenhill 1998, 312) . As Keohane (1969, 296) asserted: 'a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution'. The classic cases of established middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, are, again, illustrative cases in point. Both countries have a good record for building effective coalitions in compliance with their role models and governance capacities in niche areas (for details, see Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Cooper 1997 ; see also below). In the current context, emerging middle powers, as well, are prone to multilateralism and strive hard to build effective coalitions at emerging international platforms, such as the Group of Twenty (G20), with like-minded states because none of these actors are powerful enough to become influential on their own. Different from the established middle powers, given the fluidity of the current international order, the backbone of effective coalition-building for emerging middle powers has two main dimensions. First, these states generally have historical links to established powers as they socialise in a US-led liberal international order. Turkey, for example, has deep historical and institutional links to the West. Mexico, in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement, depicts a similar pattern. However, these countries are ambitious and assertive enough to become more vociferous in the emerging regional architecture of world politics. This brings us to the second pillar of their multilateralism strategies. Given the loosening of structure-induced factors and widening scope of coalition-building opportunities, emerging middle powers are now eager to hammer out regionalisation agreements with other rising states. It is the premise of this article that emerging middle powers are capable of playing this dual role to immensely enhance their status, but will need to rely on building effective coalitions in line with their role conceptions and interest functions through strong and diverse networks. Their diplomatic skills in forming effective, inclusive and overlapping coalition-building will determine the extent to which they can assert their norms, values and preferences in regional and global politics. For instance, MIKTA in this context is a noteworthy experiment, which brings together long-standing middle powers (Australia), a maturing middle power (South Korea) and emerging middle powers (Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey). It is interesting that the MIKTA powers are also members of the G20-hence we have an unusual case of overlapping coalition-building, where emerging powers cooperate with other major and established emerging powers and, at the same time, form their own grouping (Jongryn 2014) .
The third building block of middle-power activism involves the ability to achieve a balance between capabilities, on the one hand, and ambitions and expectations, on the other, which, in turn, is clearly related to the broader governance capacity of such states (Ravenhill 1998, 311) . It is true that 'power is now a more diffused, smarter and asymmetric concept', which provides ample space for middle-power activism (Cooper 2013, 970 ), yet this activism should constantly be checked and calibrated with underlying material capabilities. In fact, capabilities-expectations gaps are an imminent threat that looms large over middle powers. The emerging states, as ambitious status-seekers in a changing international order, can easily plunge into a kind of 'power paradox'. While trying to 'punch above their weight', these states can end up operating well below their potential. This paradox emerges when the leaders of emerging states overestimate their power capacities and opt for overambitious foreign policy strategies while they are navigating new alliance opportunities and niche areas to expand their might. The unintended consequence of a power paradox generally tends to be unfulfilled promises and unanswered threats, which massively eradicate the credibility and potential stabilising roles these states can have. In other words, due to their overambitious foreign policy rhetoric, which is inconsistent with their material capabilities, these states, more often than not, entrap themselves with bold promises that they are unable to keep, as we shall demonstrate in detail in the Turkish case below. The discrepancy between the 'rhetoric' and 'action' emanating from the fragmented governing strategies, in turn, tends to jeopardise their prestige and influence. However, if middle powers can synchronise their capabilities and expectations, they may assume an effective balancing role and contribute towards a strengthening of a cooperation-based multipolar global order.
The final element relates to the ability of emerging middle powers to identify niche areas in regional and global governance where they can make a unique and exceptional contribution. As argued in the preceding paragraphs, middle powers tend to favour multilateralism and coalition-building, due to the constraints imposed by the structure of the international system. To this end, they concentrate on certain niche areas to exert influence and gain competitive advantage in world politics. Cooper (1997) , for instance, asserts that middle powers navigate for gaps, and can fulfil and perform functional duties in global governance, which is known as 'niche diplomacy'. The established middle powers reflect successful examples of niche diplomacy. For instance, Canada is one of the countries that have exercised middle-power leadership in the human security agenda in global governance (Behringer 2005) . Australia represents another successful example of niche diplomacy in the realms of human rights, environmental goals and leadership on non-proliferation (Carr 2014, 74) . Niche diplomacy is also an increasingly crucial field of foreign policy activism for emerging middle powers. Here, the South Korean experience is again telling. South Korea, in the context of MIKTA, has focused on building research and development capabilities and technology transfer as the key areas where it can make an effective contribution to other MIKTA members, as well as on a broader scale. Similarly, Brazil's investments in global health diplomacy (Lee and Gomez 2011), Mexico's investments in global environmental politics, and Turkey's achievements in humanitarian diplomacy are other striking cases of niche diplomacy that middle powers pursue in order to scale up their power and prestige. The key point in niche diplomacy, however, is that actions need to be consistent with overall capacity, foreign policy behaviour and role conception.
Emerging middle-power activism: the paradoxical case of Turkey
This section of the article concentrates on the Turkish example as an important but mainly underexplored case of emerging middle-power activism in the literature. Turkey has demonstration capacity for other emerging middle powers and is a kind of critical case, as recent activism in Turkish foreign policy reflects both the underlying potential and imminent constraints of emerging middle powers. There are three strands to the argument. First, Turkey is a striking case of an emerging middle power with rapid economic growth, an intense democratisation experience and an avowedly proactive foreign policy over the last decade. Turkish foreign policymakers, during the era of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), strove hard to position the country as a regional power, demonstrating robust forms of leadership on regional and global platforms. Second, the role conception of Turkey has gradually shifted from that of coercive actor towards 'benign regional power'. Accordingly, Turkish political elites during the AKP era became very eager to take responsibility at regional and international forums in order to enhance the status of the country by situating it as a role model in its immediate neighbourhood. Third, Turkey is a valuable case for the purposes of this article not only because of its increasing capacity and political willingness to play an emerging middle-power role per se, but also due to the failures and dramatic setbacks it has recently encountered. In other words, the increasing discrepancy between the ambitions and capabilities in Turkish proactivism and the unintended consequences stemming from policy miscalculations enable us to derive some crucial lessons regarding the nature, potentials and limits of emerging middle-power proactivism. The following pages, therefore, will delve into the details of the paradoxical case of Turkey in line with the framework outlined in the previous section.
The virtuous cycle: Turkey as a promising emerging middle power
The story of Turkey's middle-power activism is broadly a story of three major phases, which demonstrate the ample potential and imminent risks associated with middlepower activism in world politics. The first phase, which provides illuminating examples of how middle powers can 'punch above their weight', is broadly the period from 2002 to 2007. This period corresponds to the initial term of the AKP's rule, which proved to be a real 'golden age' under the strong impetus of the European Union (EU) membership process. The second phase, covering the AKP's second period in office from 2007-11, was a period in which the AKP firmly consolidated its political power in the domestic sphere with the decline in the power and influence of the military elites, who hitherto had constituted important veto players in Turkish politics. In retrospect, the second phase was a period of relative stagnation, as the momentum of the reform process subsided in a situation where Turkey was faced with an increasingly negative international environment, with the onset of the global financial crisis and the stalemate in the EU membership process. The third phase, between 2011 and 2015, in contrast to the previous phases, signified a major decline in the AKP's performance concerning the three interrelated realms of economic development, democratisation and foreign policy performance, with important ramifications for Turkey's ability to act as an effective emerging middle power in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond.
In the early years of the AKP, Turkey entered into a virtuous cycle that clearly boosted its capacity as a role model-a process that was facilitated by a favourable international environment, in particular the global liquidity boom, and the transformative impulse of the EU membership process. The first pillar of Turkey's middle-power activism was the unprecedented performance of the Turkish economy. Following the devastating 2000-1 economic crisis, Turkey embarked on a series of major economic reforms, which spanned from strict regulation of the financial sector to the establishment of a broadbased macroeconomic discipline with a particular focus on the financial balances of the state. Significant regulatory reforms started to be implemented by the coalition government in the aftermath of the 2000-1 crisis and then continued during the AKP era in the presence of powerful external actors such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the EU. In the aftermath of the economic reforms, which strengthened the state's regulatory capacity, the Turkish economy performed well in comparison with its own historical standards. Turkey also fared well vis-à-vis the growth performance of the world economy. As a result, in current prices GDP increased from US$233 billion in 2002 to US$800 billion in 2014. Turkey's total trade also skyrocketed from US$114 billion to around US$400 billion in the same period. GDP per capita rose to US$10,404 in 2014, a threefold increase in current prices (see Table 1 ). Although the increase in constant prices demonstrates a less impressive outcome, it is still the case that the Turkish economy performed quite well in this period.
The second pillar that helped to enhance Turkey's promise to serve as a role model for its immediate and extended neighbourhood was the inspiring speed of the democratisation reforms that were embarked on during the early part of the decade-again a process that was initiated by the previous coalition government and continued under AKP rule. A vibrant economic environment coincided with an unprecedented wave of democratisation partially due to the acceleration of the EU candidacy process. During this period, Turkey enacted a series of liberalising reforms that covered a wide range of areas, including improvements in its human rights regime, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, gender equality and minority rights (Müftüler-Baç 2005) . Turkey also abolished the death penalty and crafted a new civil code in line with EU legislation. The anti-terror law, which was frequently criticised by European institutions, was also revised and liberalised. The rights of non-Muslim communities to build places of worship were recognised by the state and their properties were restored (Rodriguez, Avalos, and Yılmaz 2013) . Furthermore, the demilitarisation of Turkish politics intensified and the control of the military over Turkish politics was reduced significantly as part of the EU membership process, so that civil-military relations were tilted in favour of elected politicians (Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014) . Its enviable economic performance and impressive democratisation record catapulted Turkey into the status of a role model in the eyes of the world, as the only democratic Muslim country with a functioning market economy in a region where authoritarianism constitutes the norm. The Economist (2011), for instance, noted: 'With its secular democracy, booming economy and growing international clout, Turkey has become an inspiration for Muslims around the world'.
In this context, the third pillar that contributed to Turkey's ability to serve as a role model in its neighbourhood was the government's proactive foreign policy. During the course of the AKP's first two terms in office, Turkey adopted an explicitly proactive foreign policy strategy that positioned it as 'an emerging soft power' in its immediate neighbourhood with strong linkages to its traditional transatlantic alliance. Stated differently, the governance of Turkish foreign policy mainly relied on a set of practices that prioritised mutually inclusive coalitions with established major players and emerging regional powers simultaneously. There are two dimensions to Turkey's 'smart coalitionformation' strategy. First, the foreign policymaking elite envisioned Turkey's role as an impartial broker in the region. The AKP government reckoned, in the words of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, that 'Turkey's unique access to both the global north and south makes it a suitable mediator over a wide geographical range' (Davutoğlu 2013b, 90) . Accordingly, Turkey mediated in indirect talks between Israel and Syria in 2008 (Walker 2008) ; helped reconciliation between Iran and the West on the nuclear talks in a joint effort with Brazil (Hafezi 2010) ; and organised informal meetings among various political groups from different sects, ethnicities and religions in the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular, to mitigate the imminent conflict risks. In a similar vein, in order to strengthen its role as a 'multiregional power', Ankara succeeded in bringing Serbs and Bosniaks, archrivals in the Balkans, to join the Trilateral Balkan Summit in 2010 under the auspices of Abdullah Gül, the Turkish president of the time (Yinanç 2010) . Another example of Turkey's honest brinkmanship was the so-called Istanbul Process, launched in January 2011, which targeted the reconstruction of Afghanistan with all neighbouring countries.
Second, Turkey sought a more visible stance beyond its immediate neighbourhood in global forums. Following meticulous lobbying efforts, Ankara succeeded in becoming a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009-10, which the Turkish government accurately hailed as 'a reflection of [Turkey's] increasing weight in international politics and the confidence that the international community has in [Turkey]' (Hurriyet Daily News 2008). In 2008, Turkey did not renew its standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund and upgraded its status in the International Monetary Fund from a 'debtor' to a 'creditor' country. Concomitantly, Turkish policymakers opted for a more active role in the governance of global finance and development in the landscape of the post-crisis political economy. It became an active member of G20 summits, during which the successful fisco-financial reforms adopted in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis became an additional asset for Turkey to promote itself as a model country for emulation in the realm of global financial regulation. In terms of niche diplomacy, Turkey targeted key areas to expand its power and influence in global governance. As part of its role conception as a soft-power-oriented regional and global actor, Turkey has invested heavily in humanitarian diplomacy over the last decade. In fact, in the words of Davutoğlu (2013a, 865) : 'humanitarian diplomacy [has become] one of the explanatory principles of Turkish foreign policy, probably the most significant one'. To this end, Turkey created new public institutions and reinforced existing public institutions to better coordinate humanitarian activities around the world. Accordingly, Turkish Airlines, TİKA (the Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Kızılay (the Turkish Red Crescent), TOKİ (the Housing Development Administration of Turkey) and AFAD (the Emergency Disaster Management Presidency) gained prominence in the foreign policy repertoire, along with a plethora of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (Haşimi 2014 ). This 'humanitarian turn' in Turkish foreign policy was reflected in the numbers: the total amount of development assistance had reached US$4.3 billion in 2013, up from only US$133 million a decade earlier (see Figure 1 ). Turkey now hosts almost 2.5 million Syrian refugees along its borders and had spent more than US$8 billion as of February 2016 . As a result, Ankara's ranking ascended from nineteenth to third among government donors of international humanitarian aid (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014). As Bayer and Keyman (2012) document, niche diplomacy in this period was pursued meticulously to position Turkey as a significant humanitarian actor. Turkey adopted comprehensive policies to fill the gap in this niche area as Turkish policymakers were of the view that it fit into their broader proactive foreign policy perspective as a soft-power-driven regional player (Figure 1) .
In summary, on the basis of a number of key indicators, Turkey improved its position in the hierarchy of international politics during 2002-11. As a result, Turkey emerged as a promising middle power which had influence and an impact beyond its material power capacity. In all the dimensions of middle-power activism that are framed in this study, Turkey became a textbook example of how and through which mechanisms a middle power could 'punch above its weight'. It appears that democratisation, economic development and a multilateral foreign policy strategy impinged on and fed into one another, as a result of which the country entered into an unmatched virtuous cycle. It therefore contributed to stability and order in its neighbourhood as a role model and source of inspiration.
The vicious cycle: Turkey's reversing fortunes as an emerging middle power
If Turkey's rise as an emerging middle power during 2002-11 is the up side of the coin, the post-2011 period is equally striking since it demonstrates the conditions under which middle powers can exponentially erode their capacity and undermine their own potential. From this perspective, the Turkish case generates some crucial insights for the broader literature on the nature and limits of emerging middle-power activism. Ironically, Turkey plunged into a vicious cycle in terms of the democratisation/economic development/ foreign policy proactivism nexus during the post-2011 era, with the three elements feeding into one another and producing a powerful vicious cycle.
First, there were significant setbacks and retreats on the democratisation front. The 2011 general elections proved to be a crucial turning point in this context. In June 2011, the AKP succeeded in outperforming its rivals by obtaining almost half of the total votes-an exceptional achievement in Turkish political history. It was the first time that a political party had won three successive elections with an increasing vote share. This is an unusual phenomenon compared to Western-style democracies, where the incumbent powers have a tendency to lose their popularity over time as a result of governmental fatigue. This unprecedented success boosted the confidence of the AKP elites and generated overconfidence on the part of the executive at a time when the checksand-balance mechanisms that had constrained the AKP and its powerful leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in the previous years were being progressively dismantled. Turkish democracy in the post-2011 period suffered from the absence of an effective opposition and powerful external anchors.
In retrospect, the post-2011 period signified an era of 'electoral hegemony', in which the power of a party becomes so strong that 'it exceeds simply being a strong majority government' (Keyman 2014, 23-24 ) . The AKP's third term in office was therefore qualitatively different, as domestic politics was increasingly characterised by intense polarisation and a gradual erosion of institutional checks-and-balance mechanisms under the exclusive accumulation of political power. During the final phase of the AKP era, Turkey increasingly moved to a state of illiberal democracy. Özbudun (2014, 162) argues that, in this period, Turkey was a 'delegative democracy', a type of democracy in which horizontal accountability-i.e. 'accountability to other autonomous institutions of the state such as the legislature or the courts'-is almost non-existent. In retrospect, it appears that the unassailable electoral hegemony of the ruling party under a dominant and influential leader injected a high dose of self-confidence and the material resources to 'rule in the way that they saw fit' (Öniş 2015, 26) . As a result, the post-2011 period witnessed the revitalisation of a heavy-handed Turkish state with a traditional tendency to engineer social and political life from above, this time in a religiously conservative form through a series of changes in the education system, religious affairs and control over the bureaucracy (Talbot 2015) .
Second, the Turkish economy also encountered important challenges in the post-2011 period. There are two dimensions that led to the reversing fortunes of the economy. Clearly, part of the problem was external and related to the new equilibrium that emerged in the international economy following the 2008 global financial crisis. In the post-2009 period, the global markets experienced a phase of sharp turbulence, during which low growth rates, declining foreign investment and shrinking space for trade became the defining parameters of the new norm. Not surprisingly, the Turkish economy was also influenced by the global slump (Öniş and Kutlay 2013) . For instance, Turkey's annual economic growth fell to 3.1 percent in the post-2011 period, from almost 7 percent in the pre-crisis period. Turkey's foreign direct investment performance also faltered due to the tightening liquidity conditions in the global markets (see Table 1 ). Beyond the negative external influences, developments in the domestic sphere also hampered Turkey's economic performance. What was quite striking in this context was the way in which the creeping authoritarianism in the political sphere spilled over and had negative repercussions in the economic realm. The independence of regulatory institutions was increasingly undermined. A good example is the growing interventionism by political authorities in the operations of the Central Bank. This clearly was in sharp contrast to the early years of the AKP rule, where independent regulatory institutions were part and parcel of a strong regulatory state, which contributed to economic success (Özel 2012) . Similarly, the increasing politicisation of public tenders and various rent-extraction mechanisms jeopardised the rules-based governance logic in the Turkish economy (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014; Today's Zaman 2015) . Another salient feature of the third phase of the AKP rule involved serious allegations of corruption against key party figures, a phenomenon that was conspicuously absent during earlier phases of the AKP era. These forces contributed to an episode of relative stagnation of the economy, which is clearly signified by the fact that Turkey's GDP per capita appeared to be stuck at around US$10,500 over the last five years. The Turkish economy has been confronted with serious challenges. It has been increasingly identified as one of the riskiest countries among the emerging countries due to its high current account deficits and dependence on foreign capital (Beattie 2015) . The fragile situation in question has raised the possibility of a new domestically generated economic crisis for the first time since 2001, thereby undermining Turkey's role-model capabilities.
The vicious cycle that has entrapped Turkey reached its peak with the paradigmatic shifts in Turkish foreign policy in the aftermath of the Arab upheavals. The political earthquake that shook the Arab world also reshuffled the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy. In fact, in the initial phases, the tectonic transformations taking place in its neighbourhood provided a historical window of opportunity for Turkey to expand the 'Turkish model' throughout the region because, for the first time in decades, the establishment of a liberal democracy with a free market economy has become a genuine possibility in the Muslim world. Davutoğlu, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, even affirmed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly that '[a] new Middle East is about to be born. [And Turkey] will be the owner, pioneer and the servant of this new Middle East' (Hurriyet Daily News 2012). The post-Arab Spring Turkish foreign policy, however, experienced certain inconsistencies, which undermined Turkey's effectiveness as an influential emerging middle power.
Turkey, in the new turbulent era of the Arab revolutions, increasingly suffered from inconsistencies between its rhetoric and its actions. While Turkish domestic politics experienced a striking illiberal turn under the electoral hegemony of the governing party, Turkey claimed to support democratic transitions in its neighbourhood. The sharp divergence of its domestic politics and foreign policy behaviour clearly undermined the credibility of Turkey as a key actor in promoting democracy and, in turn, also undermined its ability to serve as a regional role model. Second, Turkey increasingly suffered from inconsistencies between its capabilities and its expectations. Ankara's overambitious desire to position itself as an 'order-setting regional power' and transform the region in its mirror image led to Turkey's overinvolvement in the domestic affairs of key Arab Spring countries, especially in the context of the ongoing war in Syria and the domestic turmoil in Egypt. The unintended outcome was the growing perception of Turkey as a country that increasingly contributed to instability in the region by taking an active part in sectarian conflicts that appeared to contrast sharply with its previous positive image of a benign regional power and honest broker.
The era of the Arab revolutions was an unprecedented and, on the whole, disappointing period for Turkey's middle-power aspirations (Kuru 2015) . In the pre-Arab Spring era, Turkey had been able to position itself as a benign regional actor whose soft power was based on economic interdependence, cultural ties and a common identity. The promotion of democracy was not explicit on the foreign policy agenda. From the onset of the Arab revolutions onwards, however, Turkey projected its image as a key actor in the promotion of democracy. Beyond the turbulence and complexity of the region itself, including the inherent resilience of the authoritarian structures that steadily undermined the early optimism associated with the Arab uprisings, Turkey undermined its own credentials due to a number of overlapping inconsistencies. While acting very assertively to accomplish political change in specific instances-such as Assad's Syria and Sisi's Egypt and over-intervening extensively-the AKP government also looked in the direction of the authoritarian BRICS, identifying the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative to the EU, which again sharply contrasted with its democracy promotion aspirations and credentials. It was not surprising, therefore, that Turkey's relations with its Western allies faltered in the period following the Arab uprisings. As a result, inclusive and encompassing coalitionbuilding proved to be very difficult for Turkish policymakers. While Turkey continued to be firmly anchored in Western security structures, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and bilateral security ties between Turkey and the USA continued to be important, the Western perception of Turkey was progressively of a country that was no longer an integral part of the Western identity. For instance, vital rifts emerged between Turkey and Western countries over Syria, where Turkey was single-mindedly committed to the removal of the Assad regime, whilst showing a certain reluctance to deal with the major threat from a Western perspective-Islamic State and the jihadist threat that it presented. Ironically, Turkey found itself increasingly isolated and once again encountered insurmountable security problems with a variety of countries in its neighbourhood. Authoritarianism at home was accompanied by isolationism abroad, which key figures of the AKP foreign policymaking elite also reluctantly acknowledged, using the term 'precious isolationism' and 'value-centered isolationism' to denote 'Turkey's principled loneliness' (Hurriyet Daily News 2013).
To be fair, the Western powers also did not display an admirable record during the Arab uprisings. In Egypt, one could argue that the Western powers failed to adequately engage with the Islamist actors preceding the coup and then failed to mount an effective challenge to Sisi's military-based regime after the coup. Similarly, there was reluctance on the part of the Western states to challenge the Assad regime and the humanitarian crisis that it produced, in the same way as they decided to deal with the Qaddafi regime in Libya. These criticisms are valid. However, they also illustrate the limits of how much Turkey could have achieved on the basis of its own actions as an extremely ambitious and proactive actor in a region where both great powers and important middle powers-including key regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Iran-have been actively involved. From a longer-term perspective, one could argue that the interests of Turkey and the Western powers did not diverge sharply. However, in the short run, major synchronisation problems emerged between the parties (Yorulmazlar and Turhan 2015) . This, in turn, paved the way for the deepening of the capabilities-expectations gap in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey increasingly projected the image of a 'torn country' in the emerging geopolitical axis of the new order, where it has been uncomfortably placed between the Western axis, on the one hand, and the Russia-China axis, on the other. Its foreign policy has been characterised by oscillations between excessive unilateralism, on the one hand, and commitment to multilateralism, on the other. In a striking fashion, Turkey found itself in a power paradox that is typical of emerging middle powers: while trying to 'punch above its weight', Turkey turned into an actor that was performing well below its capabilities ( Table 2 ).
In conclusion, the authoritarian turn in Turkish politics and its eroding economic performance reversed the fortunes of the country as a role model in the eyes of international and regional actors in the post-2011 period. Overambitious foreign policy strategies and the inability to form inclusive and encompassing coalitions during the post-Arab Spring period undermined Turkey's middle-power activism. On that note, it is crucial to underscore that domestic politics, economic performance and foreign policy activism impinged on one another in an interactive manner so that the vicious cycle informed all of the building blocks of Turkey's middle-power activism. As a result, Turkey, once seen as a Muslim mid-range country with a robust democratisation performance and economic vibrancy, has gradually lost its attractiveness and potential to play a crucial stabilising role in regional and global governance structures. The Economist described this sharp swing as follows:
Until recently Turkey, a NATO member that is in membership talks with the EU, was hailed as a shining example of a Muslim country where Islam and democracy can coexist. But a mix of hubris, pro-Sunni sectarianism and bad judgment on the part of the Islam-inspired Justice and Development (AK) party, has drained the country of its soft power (The Economist 2014). An uneasy mix of multilateralism and unilateralism.
Weakening of performance in recent years, which has resulted in performance significantly below the country's true potential.
Governance capacity and capabilitiesexpectations balance
In the early stages of the AKP era, Turkey's role was in line with an effective, benign regional-power role.
Rediscovering its neighbourhood and forming significant economic and diplomatic linkages with the multiple regions with which it has been engaged -namely, the broader Middle East, Russia and Eurasia, as well as the Balkans.
A major mismatch between ambitions and capabilities, starting in the later part of the AKP era.
Overactivism abroad through engagement in the domestic political conflicts of countries like Syria and Egypt has been costly and brought criticisms of Turkish foreign policy as being sectarian or divisive, contributing to regional instability.
The weakening of Turkey's role due to an expectations-capabilities mismatch and the failure to govern Turkey's foreign policy effectively and in line with middle-power capacities. Turkey represents an important case that has undermined its potential through over-interventionism.
Identifying niche areas in global governance
Turkey's role is conceived as that of a mediator in key regional and international conflicts. Projects itself as a key emerging donor and humanitarian actor, with an emphasis on helping the least-developed nations.
Presents itself as a model in the area of banking regulation and financial governance following the successful restructuring in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis.
Turkey's role as a mediator is undermined by its policy of taking sides in key disputes. An open-door policy towards Syrian refugees in line with its claims for establishing itself as a major humanitarian actor. The policy has been costly in terms of the numbers of refugees involved and the domestic insecurity and instability that the policy has generated.
A mixed picture: elements of success coupled with elements of failure. Elements of failure are more striking in the recent era.
Lessons learned from the Turkish case: implications for the broader literature This article has attempted to understand the properties, potentials and limits of emerging middle-power activism in a changing global order. Extensive debate on the rise of emerging powers notwithstanding, the potential contributions of emerging middle powers in regional and global governance are an understudied issue in the literature. This study has aimed to fill this gap by offering a broad conceptual framework for middle-power activism and testing it with reference to the Turkish example-a striking but neglected actor in the emerging middle-power literature. To this end, we have offered a synthetic approach that aims to combine the mainstream literature (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Ravenhill 1998) with recent debates (Jordaan 2003; Wang and French 2013) . Accordingly, we have outlined four interactive and mutually inclusive, rather than hierarchic factors that condition middle-power activism. The building blocks are composed of relatively definitive/stable variables that are latent in all countries by virtue of being a middle power-such as material capabilities-and improvable limits-such as rolemodel capabilities, niche diplomacy and alliance-building capacity-depending on the context in which emerging middle powers operate. We have maintained that the importance of the four building blocks might vary according to the contextual factors, as is the case in the Turkish example where its role-model capacity guided the other variables. We have suggested that the non-hierarchic and interactive nature of the building blocks of middle-power activism reflects not only pure foreign policy, but also the dynamic interaction of broadly structural and domestic political economy settings. To this end, the Turkish case has some remarkable ramifications for the broader discussion of emerging middle-power activism.
The first key lesson is that domestic political economy dynamics turn out to be a central driving force for emerging middle powers. The Turkish experience during the early part of the AKP era clearly demonstrates that favourable domestic political economy dynamics contribute to a virtuous cycle with positive spillover effects on foreign policy and the ability to perform a constructive regional-power role as a role model. By a similar logic, the latest phase of the AKP era shows how unfavourable political economy dynamics at home were translated into unproductive forms of foreign policy engagements, which, through acts of excessive unilateralism and taking direct sides in the difficult domestic conflicts of neighbouring states, can undermine the soft-power capabilities of a potentially important middle power. These findings suggest that despite emerging middle powers having ambitions to perceive themselves as role models and sources of inspiration in their respective regions in a changing global order, their political and economic development models still suffer from imminent domestic fragilities.
The second broad implication is that, by definition, the term 'emerging middle power' signifies recognition of inherent limitations as well as capabilities. A cursory examination of Turkey's Middle East policy during the era of the Arab uprisings clearly illustrates that Turkish policymakers had more grandiose schemes in mind. The emerging middle powers, in an age of excessive fluidity, find themselves on a knife-edge equilibrium in the sense that if they cannot synchronise their ambitions with their capacities and balance-of-power dynamics, they can easily turn into actors that are punching well below their weight as an unintended consequence of their unchecked proactive strategies.
In this sense, the expectations-capabilities gap is a key factor that can undermine the effectiveness of emerging middle powers and turn them into contributors to instability rather than security-producing actors.
The third implication concerns the ability to build effective coalitions on the basis of a consistent set of normative principles. Emerging middle powers are faced with ubiquitous challenges in alliance preferences as well. On the one hand, they are more critical of the existing Western-led world order and inclined to pursue delegitimisation strategies. In other words, they can easily alienate themselves from their Western allies. On the other hand, a unilateral stance or pursuing active alliances with other emerging powers proves highly detrimental for their stability and influence in global governance. In this sense, the crucial variable that ensures mutually inclusive and encompassing coalitions in an efficient manner is the set of principles on which the emerging middle powers rely. The Turkish experience in the context of the Arab uprisings once again illustrates how an emerging power can undermine its international credibility and self-image through inconsistencies between rhetoric and action. The fact that Turkey was putting itself forward as a democracy-promoting actor abroad whilst undermining democratic principles at home is a clear example of inconsistent norms and their pervasive impact on the alliance-formation capacity of an emerging middle power.
In conclusion, besides extrapolating some general tendencies in terms of the properties through which emerging middle powers can 'punch above their weight' in global governance or suffer from an acute power paradox, these cases also have certain unique characteristics. For instance, in the current phase of domestic affairs, the challenge for Turkey is whether it will have the capacity to reverse the negative political economy dynamics of the recent period and revitalise the momentum of the early phase of the AKP era, which will allow it to play a more constructive role in a highly turbulent region. From a broader point of view, the advantage for Turkey compared to other emerging middle powers is that it is located in a region where, in comparative terms, there are more serious problems to be solved, ranging from authoritarian resilience to weak economic development, from failed states to jihadism. Hence, it is a region where an emerging middle power can have a real impact, but only on the condition that it conforms to a certain set of principles that define the appropriate circumstances for effective middle-power influence. Thus, in the final analysis, the framework proposed in this study should be applied by taking into consideration the contextual aspects of the regions in which these actors are embedded and socialised. Notes 1. We use the term 'near-BRICS' for regional powers that are achieving high growth performance, demonstrating regional leadership ambitions and following economy-driven autonomous foreign policy strategies. In the literature, there are alternative definitions attributed to these states, such as 'middle powers', 'swing states', 'emerging powers' and 'great peripheral states'. In this study, we call them 'near-BRICS' in order to refer to the 'demonstration effects' of BRICS on these countries. In other words, these states possess similar characteristics to BRICS regarding their economic growth performance and rising regional and international presence; nevertheless, they are not as significant as BRICS in terms of their economic scale (see Kutlay 2013, 1424) .
2. We should note that Sandal (2014) investigates middle-power status/policies as being a pragmatic legitimation strategy. However, we diverge from Sandal in the sense that we conceptualise middle-power strategy in emerging powers as being more than a legitimation strategy. We also see their roles as more than 'mediators' in international politics by putting emphasis on the broader conception of their role-model capabilities.
